Asymmetric Evolutionary Game between Financial Innovation and Financial Regulation ---- Punishment or Encouragement

Huang Ran; Fan Qun

doi:doi:10.11648/j.jfa.20170503.13

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Asymmetric Evolutionary Game between Financial Innovation and Financial Regulation ---- Punishment or Encouragement

Huang Ran, Fan Qun

Published in Journal of Finance and Accounting (Volume 5, Issue 3)

Received: 19 May 2017 Published: 20 May 2017

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Abstract

After the financial crisis in 2007, the high risk brought by financial innovation has aroused widespread concern and thinking again. The measures to curb financial innovation in various countries have become increasingly severe. However, under the background of the supply-side reform proposed by the Chinese government, the reform of the financial capital elements of the supply root is imperative. Therefore, how to curb the risk of innovation in financial institutions effectively, while encouraging innovation in favor of financial supply side of the reform of compliance, become an important issue to be solved. Based on the limited rationality, the long - term dynamic game equilibrium between financial institutions and regulators and its impact on financial system and financial market is analyzed by constructing asymmetric evolutionary dynamic game model. Then, analyzing the relevant factors of long-term equilibrium, and puts forward the regulatory measures which are conducive to encouraging the reform of compliance and the reform of financial supply-side.

Published in	Journal of Finance and Accounting (Volume 5, Issue 3)
DOI	10.11648/j.jfa.20170503.13
Page(s)	102-106
Creative Commons	This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited.
Copyright	Copyright © The Author(s), 2017. Published by Science Publishing Group

Keywords

Financial Innovation, Financial Regulation, Evolutionary Game

References

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[7]	Chun He. Evolutionary game: a dialectical review of the relationship between financial innovation and financial regulation [J]. Theoretical Discussion, 2012 (11).
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APA Style

Huang Ran, Fan Qun. (2017). Asymmetric Evolutionary Game between Financial Innovation and Financial Regulation ---- Punishment or Encouragement. Journal of Finance and Accounting, 5(3), 102-106. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jfa.20170503.13

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ACS Style

Huang Ran; Fan Qun. Asymmetric Evolutionary Game between Financial Innovation and Financial Regulation ---- Punishment or Encouragement. J. Finance Account. 2017, 5(3), 102-106. doi: 10.11648/j.jfa.20170503.13

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AMA Style

Huang Ran, Fan Qun. Asymmetric Evolutionary Game between Financial Innovation and Financial Regulation ---- Punishment or Encouragement. J Finance Account. 2017;5(3):102-106. doi: 10.11648/j.jfa.20170503.13

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@article{10.11648/j.jfa.20170503.13,
  author = {Huang Ran and Fan Qun},
  title = {Asymmetric Evolutionary Game between Financial Innovation and Financial Regulation ---- Punishment or Encouragement},
  journal = {Journal of Finance and Accounting},
  volume = {5},
  number = {3},
  pages = {102-106},
  doi = {10.11648/j.jfa.20170503.13},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jfa.20170503.13},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.jfa.20170503.13},
  abstract = {After the financial crisis in 2007, the high risk brought by financial innovation has aroused widespread concern and thinking again. The measures to curb financial innovation in various countries have become increasingly severe. However, under the background of the supply-side reform proposed by the Chinese government, the reform of the financial capital elements of the supply root is imperative. Therefore, how to curb the risk of innovation in financial institutions effectively, while encouraging innovation in favor of financial supply side of the reform of compliance, become an important issue to be solved. Based on the limited rationality, the long - term dynamic game equilibrium between financial institutions and regulators and its impact on financial system and financial market is analyzed by constructing asymmetric evolutionary dynamic game model. Then, analyzing the relevant factors of long-term equilibrium, and puts forward the regulatory measures which are conducive to encouraging the reform of compliance and the reform of financial supply-side.},
 year = {2017}
}

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TY  - JOUR
T1  - Asymmetric Evolutionary Game between Financial Innovation and Financial Regulation ---- Punishment or Encouragement
AU  - Huang Ran
AU  - Fan Qun
Y1  - 2017/05/20
PY  - 2017
N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jfa.20170503.13
DO  - 10.11648/j.jfa.20170503.13
T2  - Journal of Finance and Accounting
JF  - Journal of Finance and Accounting
JO  - Journal of Finance and Accounting
SP  - 102
EP  - 106
PB  - Science Publishing Group
SN  - 2330-7323
UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jfa.20170503.13
AB  - After the financial crisis in 2007, the high risk brought by financial innovation has aroused widespread concern and thinking again. The measures to curb financial innovation in various countries have become increasingly severe. However, under the background of the supply-side reform proposed by the Chinese government, the reform of the financial capital elements of the supply root is imperative. Therefore, how to curb the risk of innovation in financial institutions effectively, while encouraging innovation in favor of financial supply side of the reform of compliance, become an important issue to be solved. Based on the limited rationality, the long - term dynamic game equilibrium between financial institutions and regulators and its impact on financial system and financial market is analyzed by constructing asymmetric evolutionary dynamic game model. Then, analyzing the relevant factors of long-term equilibrium, and puts forward the regulatory measures which are conducive to encouraging the reform of compliance and the reform of financial supply-side.
VL  - 5
IS  - 3
ER  -

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Author Information

Huang Ran

Economics and Business Management Department, Hua Zhong Normal University, Wuhan, China
Fan Qun

Economics and Business Management Department, Hua Zhong Normal University, Wuhan, China

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APA Style

Huang Ran, Fan Qun. (2017). Asymmetric Evolutionary Game between Financial Innovation and Financial Regulation ---- Punishment or Encouragement. Journal of Finance and Accounting, 5(3), 102-106. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jfa.20170503.13

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ACS Style

Huang Ran; Fan Qun. Asymmetric Evolutionary Game between Financial Innovation and Financial Regulation ---- Punishment or Encouragement. J. Finance Account. 2017, 5(3), 102-106. doi: 10.11648/j.jfa.20170503.13

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AMA Style

Huang Ran, Fan Qun. Asymmetric Evolutionary Game between Financial Innovation and Financial Regulation ---- Punishment or Encouragement. J Finance Account. 2017;5(3):102-106. doi: 10.11648/j.jfa.20170503.13

Copy | Download

@article{10.11648/j.jfa.20170503.13,
  author = {Huang Ran and Fan Qun},
  title = {Asymmetric Evolutionary Game between Financial Innovation and Financial Regulation ---- Punishment or Encouragement},
  journal = {Journal of Finance and Accounting},
  volume = {5},
  number = {3},
  pages = {102-106},
  doi = {10.11648/j.jfa.20170503.13},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jfa.20170503.13},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.jfa.20170503.13},
  abstract = {After the financial crisis in 2007, the high risk brought by financial innovation has aroused widespread concern and thinking again. The measures to curb financial innovation in various countries have become increasingly severe. However, under the background of the supply-side reform proposed by the Chinese government, the reform of the financial capital elements of the supply root is imperative. Therefore, how to curb the risk of innovation in financial institutions effectively, while encouraging innovation in favor of financial supply side of the reform of compliance, become an important issue to be solved. Based on the limited rationality, the long - term dynamic game equilibrium between financial institutions and regulators and its impact on financial system and financial market is analyzed by constructing asymmetric evolutionary dynamic game model. Then, analyzing the relevant factors of long-term equilibrium, and puts forward the regulatory measures which are conducive to encouraging the reform of compliance and the reform of financial supply-side.},
 year = {2017}
}

Copy | Download

TY  - JOUR
T1  - Asymmetric Evolutionary Game between Financial Innovation and Financial Regulation ---- Punishment or Encouragement
AU  - Huang Ran
AU  - Fan Qun
Y1  - 2017/05/20
PY  - 2017
N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jfa.20170503.13
DO  - 10.11648/j.jfa.20170503.13
T2  - Journal of Finance and Accounting
JF  - Journal of Finance and Accounting
JO  - Journal of Finance and Accounting
SP  - 102
EP  - 106
PB  - Science Publishing Group
SN  - 2330-7323
UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jfa.20170503.13
AB  - After the financial crisis in 2007, the high risk brought by financial innovation has aroused widespread concern and thinking again. The measures to curb financial innovation in various countries have become increasingly severe. However, under the background of the supply-side reform proposed by the Chinese government, the reform of the financial capital elements of the supply root is imperative. Therefore, how to curb the risk of innovation in financial institutions effectively, while encouraging innovation in favor of financial supply side of the reform of compliance, become an important issue to be solved. Based on the limited rationality, the long - term dynamic game equilibrium between financial institutions and regulators and its impact on financial system and financial market is analyzed by constructing asymmetric evolutionary dynamic game model. Then, analyzing the relevant factors of long-term equilibrium, and puts forward the regulatory measures which are conducive to encouraging the reform of compliance and the reform of financial supply-side.
VL  - 5
IS  - 3
ER  -

Copy | Download