President's Legislative Programs in the United States as a Non-monopoly and Non-commanding Power

Yu Zhaobo

doi:doi:10.11648/j.ss.20211001.12

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President's Legislative Programs in the United States as a Non-monopoly and Non-commanding Power

Yu Zhaobo

Published in Social Sciences (Volume 10, Issue 1)

Received: 23 December 2020 Accepted: 15 February 2021 Published: 26 February 2021

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Abstract

The president's programs are not monopoly and excluding, rather competitive and open to the members of congress; not commanding and abiding by, rather persuading and being persuaded; not comprehensively dominating the whole process of the Congress, rather only leading the legislative process of the Congress. The president 's programs exit in the State of the Union Address mostly. The reasons include the Constitution of the United States, the president itself and the congress itself ext.. The president's programs are based on separation, checks & balance, are different from rights-reflecting legislative plans of England and China's autonomous legislative plans. China's autonomous legislative plans include three categories mandatory plans that must be completed when conditions are ripe, guiding plans that are ready to be completed as far as possible and researching plans that continue to be studied and considered according to circumstances. The president should struggle for his (or her) legislative programs to pass and is constraint of objective, subjective and externally environmental factors. Whether the president can successfully start the legislative programs of the Congress and whether each legislative project can pass through the legislative process of the Congress can be judged objectively by the president's public opinion support rate and party support rate, and subjectively by the president's subjective efforts, negotiation ability and persuasion ability, as well as the external environment when the president competes with the Congress, such as war or peace, economic situation, etc.

Published in	Social Sciences (Volume 10, Issue 1)
DOI	10.11648/j.ss.20211001.12
Page(s)	7-14
Creative Commons	This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited.
Copyright	Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Science Publishing Group

Keywords

Legislative Plan, U.S. President, U.S. Congress

References

[1]	Samuel Kernell, Roger Larocca, Huchen Liu, et al. New Data for Investigating the President’s Legislative Program. 2019, 49 (2): 330-357.
[2]	PIKA A, NORMAN C T, RICHARD A. The politics of the presidency [M]. Washington, D. C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1994: 202.
[3]	Kim, BH (Kim, Bong Hwan): The president and asymmetric use of information [J]. Applied Economics Letters, 2019, 26 (14): 1214-1217.
[4]	RUDALEVIGE A. Managing the president's program (presidential leadership and legislative policy formulation) [M]. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2002: 3.
[5]	Wang Mingyang. American administrative law (I) [M]. Beijing: China legal press, 1995: 139.
[6]	Jiang Jinsong. Legislative planning in Britain [J]. National People's Congress work bulletin, 1996 (2): 37-38.
[7]	Zhou Wangsheng. Some theoretical issues on legislative planning [J]. Journal of Peking University (PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL SCIENCES), 1993 (3): 49.
[8]	Cai Dingjian. The development and historical transformation of the legislation of the people's Congress in the past 20 years [M] / / Cai Dingjian, Wang Chenguang. Development and reform of the people's Congress in the past 20 years. Beijing: China procuratorial press, 2001: 59.
[9]	MAYHEW R. Divided we govern party control, lawmaking and Investigations 1946—2002 [M]. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2005: 2.
[10]	BOND R, RICHARD F, DAN W. The marginal and time-varying effect of public approval on presidential success in Congress [J]. The Journal of Politics, 2003, 65 (1): 92-110.
[11]	BRANDON C, STEVEN A. Enduring rivals: presidential success and support in the house of representatives [J]. Congress & The Presidency, 2006 (33): 21-46.
[12]	RICHARD E. Presidential power: the politics of leadership [M]. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964: 35.

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APA Style

Yu Zhaobo. (2021). President's Legislative Programs in the United States as a Non-monopoly and Non-commanding Power. Social Sciences, 10(1), 7-14. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ss.20211001.12

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ACS Style

Yu Zhaobo. President's Legislative Programs in the United States as a Non-monopoly and Non-commanding Power. Soc. Sci. 2021, 10(1), 7-14. doi: 10.11648/j.ss.20211001.12

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AMA Style

Yu Zhaobo. President's Legislative Programs in the United States as a Non-monopoly and Non-commanding Power. Soc Sci. 2021;10(1):7-14. doi: 10.11648/j.ss.20211001.12

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@article{10.11648/j.ss.20211001.12,
  author = {Yu Zhaobo},
  title = {President's Legislative Programs in the United States as a Non-monopoly and Non-commanding Power},
  journal = {Social Sciences},
  volume = {10},
  number = {1},
  pages = {7-14},
  doi = {10.11648/j.ss.20211001.12},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ss.20211001.12},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ss.20211001.12},
  abstract = {The president's programs are not monopoly and excluding, rather competitive and open to the members of congress; not commanding and abiding by, rather persuading and being persuaded; not comprehensively dominating the whole process of the Congress, rather only leading the legislative process of the Congress. The president 's programs exit in the State of the Union Address mostly. The reasons include the Constitution of the United States, the president itself and the congress itself ext.. The president's programs are based on separation, checks & balance, are different from rights-reflecting legislative plans of England and China's autonomous legislative plans. China's autonomous legislative plans include three categories mandatory plans that must be completed when conditions are ripe, guiding plans that are ready to be completed as far as possible and researching plans that continue to be studied and considered according to circumstances. The president should struggle for his (or her) legislative programs to pass and is constraint of objective, subjective and externally environmental factors. Whether the president can successfully start the legislative programs of the Congress and whether each legislative project can pass through the legislative process of the Congress can be judged objectively by the president's public opinion support rate and party support rate, and subjectively by the president's subjective efforts, negotiation ability and persuasion ability, as well as the external environment when the president competes with the Congress, such as war or peace, economic situation, etc.},
 year = {2021}
}

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TY  - JOUR
T1  - President's Legislative Programs in the United States as a Non-monopoly and Non-commanding Power
AU  - Yu Zhaobo
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PY  - 2021
N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ss.20211001.12
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PB  - Science Publishing Group
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UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ss.20211001.12
AB  - The president's programs are not monopoly and excluding, rather competitive and open to the members of congress; not commanding and abiding by, rather persuading and being persuaded; not comprehensively dominating the whole process of the Congress, rather only leading the legislative process of the Congress. The president 's programs exit in the State of the Union Address mostly. The reasons include the Constitution of the United States, the president itself and the congress itself ext.. The president's programs are based on separation, checks & balance, are different from rights-reflecting legislative plans of England and China's autonomous legislative plans. China's autonomous legislative plans include three categories mandatory plans that must be completed when conditions are ripe, guiding plans that are ready to be completed as far as possible and researching plans that continue to be studied and considered according to circumstances. The president should struggle for his (or her) legislative programs to pass and is constraint of objective, subjective and externally environmental factors. Whether the president can successfully start the legislative programs of the Congress and whether each legislative project can pass through the legislative process of the Congress can be judged objectively by the president's public opinion support rate and party support rate, and subjectively by the president's subjective efforts, negotiation ability and persuasion ability, as well as the external environment when the president competes with the Congress, such as war or peace, economic situation, etc.
VL  - 10
IS  - 1
ER  -

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Author Information

Yu Zhaobo

School of Law, Beijing Institute of Technology, Beijing, the People's Republic of China

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Plain Text BibTeX RIS

APA Style

Yu Zhaobo. (2021). President's Legislative Programs in the United States as a Non-monopoly and Non-commanding Power. Social Sciences, 10(1), 7-14. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ss.20211001.12

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ACS Style

Yu Zhaobo. President's Legislative Programs in the United States as a Non-monopoly and Non-commanding Power. Soc. Sci. 2021, 10(1), 7-14. doi: 10.11648/j.ss.20211001.12

Copy | Download

AMA Style

Yu Zhaobo. President's Legislative Programs in the United States as a Non-monopoly and Non-commanding Power. Soc Sci. 2021;10(1):7-14. doi: 10.11648/j.ss.20211001.12

Copy | Download

@article{10.11648/j.ss.20211001.12,
  author = {Yu Zhaobo},
  title = {President's Legislative Programs in the United States as a Non-monopoly and Non-commanding Power},
  journal = {Social Sciences},
  volume = {10},
  number = {1},
  pages = {7-14},
  doi = {10.11648/j.ss.20211001.12},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ss.20211001.12},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ss.20211001.12},
  abstract = {The president's programs are not monopoly and excluding, rather competitive and open to the members of congress; not commanding and abiding by, rather persuading and being persuaded; not comprehensively dominating the whole process of the Congress, rather only leading the legislative process of the Congress. The president 's programs exit in the State of the Union Address mostly. The reasons include the Constitution of the United States, the president itself and the congress itself ext.. The president's programs are based on separation, checks & balance, are different from rights-reflecting legislative plans of England and China's autonomous legislative plans. China's autonomous legislative plans include three categories mandatory plans that must be completed when conditions are ripe, guiding plans that are ready to be completed as far as possible and researching plans that continue to be studied and considered according to circumstances. The president should struggle for his (or her) legislative programs to pass and is constraint of objective, subjective and externally environmental factors. Whether the president can successfully start the legislative programs of the Congress and whether each legislative project can pass through the legislative process of the Congress can be judged objectively by the president's public opinion support rate and party support rate, and subjectively by the president's subjective efforts, negotiation ability and persuasion ability, as well as the external environment when the president competes with the Congress, such as war or peace, economic situation, etc.},
 year = {2021}
}

Copy | Download

TY  - JOUR
T1  - President's Legislative Programs in the United States as a Non-monopoly and Non-commanding Power
AU  - Yu Zhaobo
Y1  - 2021/02/26
PY  - 2021
N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ss.20211001.12
DO  - 10.11648/j.ss.20211001.12
T2  - Social Sciences
JF  - Social Sciences
JO  - Social Sciences
SP  - 7
EP  - 14
PB  - Science Publishing Group
SN  - 2326-988X
UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ss.20211001.12
AB  - The president's programs are not monopoly and excluding, rather competitive and open to the members of congress; not commanding and abiding by, rather persuading and being persuaded; not comprehensively dominating the whole process of the Congress, rather only leading the legislative process of the Congress. The president 's programs exit in the State of the Union Address mostly. The reasons include the Constitution of the United States, the president itself and the congress itself ext.. The president's programs are based on separation, checks & balance, are different from rights-reflecting legislative plans of England and China's autonomous legislative plans. China's autonomous legislative plans include three categories mandatory plans that must be completed when conditions are ripe, guiding plans that are ready to be completed as far as possible and researching plans that continue to be studied and considered according to circumstances. The president should struggle for his (or her) legislative programs to pass and is constraint of objective, subjective and externally environmental factors. Whether the president can successfully start the legislative programs of the Congress and whether each legislative project can pass through the legislative process of the Congress can be judged objectively by the president's public opinion support rate and party support rate, and subjectively by the president's subjective efforts, negotiation ability and persuasion ability, as well as the external environment when the president competes with the Congress, such as war or peace, economic situation, etc.
VL  - 10
IS  - 1
ER  -

Copy | Download